by
Rogier van Vlissingen
| Aug 31, 2011
A careful reading of various lawsuits and settlements between banks and their customers in account takeover cases, and other security related problems, make it very clear that the courts are starting to realize that good enough is no longer good enough, and that in security the minimal 'compliance' with regulatory requirements may in fact be unsatisfactory and inadequate.
Businesses are also finding out that they are responsible for knowing what they are doing. Some banks promote zero risk for their debit cards, but not infrequently the large print giveth and the small print taketh away. Too often the zero liability does NOT apply to pin transactions. Be that as it may, as a business it is important to know that you are expected to know what you are doing, and the banks tend to treat businesses differently than consumers. So best practices applies to the business customers of a bank even more so than it does to consumers. Ignorance is not a defense against irresponsible practices and inadequate security.
As I have argued elsewhere, see: Why this time is different -- in security very few things are black and white, but one is, and it makes a perfect example of the meaning of best practices. GuardedID® has been on the market for 5 years, and even if we allow that nothing is 100%, it is in essence a completely off/on, black and white situation. Either you are blocking key logging or you are not. Since it is well documented that keylogging is a very prevalent threat, and figures in most of the major security breaches that you read about (and in most of the breaches you don't hear about), there is every reason to stop it outright. So why didn't you.
This is black and white. Something like backing up your data - either you did, or you did not, and if that's your job, and you didn't, we should get someone else to do your job. Key logging is the same, every since it became prominent in 2004 or so, no one in the industry can claim ignorance, and it is now an every day occurrence, and the logic is powerful. The amateur malware of yesteryear was mostly an annoyance, a business disruption perhaps, but not much more. The well targeted attacks of today are designed to be smooth. They do not want your computer, in fact, they don't want to cause you any inconvenience, as long as they can get your data. Any data will do, login credentials for financial accounts preferred.
So now back to best practices, and granted that there are other ways to steal your data aside from key logging, the comparison now is that some anti-virus software claims to defend against key loggers - to the extent that it is signature based, that means elimination of a good percentage of known threats, and zero against unknown threats (zero day risk), and it generally protects your computer, and keeps it operational, and safe from disruption by malware, but... it only detects key loggers some small percentage of the time. Usually 20% or less according to some reports. But data theft is the objective, not computer disruption. So, once you realize that your DATA is the assets that is targeted, should you focus first on protecting your computer from disruption, or protecting your data from theft? And if you know (and if you didn't, you know now), that there is a choice between 20% protection, and complete blockage of key logging, the largest single methodology used for data theft - would you take the 20% or the 100%?
It is these kinds of considerations that are coming to the surface in these court cases - having installed some protection that nominally meets requirements, in the face of a far superior and well known alternative is not a defense. Just like ignorance of the law is no defense. The security game is changing.